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Abstract
Levesque introduced the notion of only-knowing to precisely
capture the beliefs of a knowledge base. He also showed how
only-knowing can be used to formalize non-monotonic be-
havior within a monotonic logic. Despite its appeal, all at-
tempts to extend only-knowing to the many agent case have
undesirable properties. A belief model by Halpern and Lake-
meyer, for instance, appeals to proof-theoretic constructs in
the semantics and needs to axiomatize validity as part of the
logic. It is also not clear how to generalize their ideas to a
first-order case. In this paper, we propose a new account
of multi-agent only-knowing which, for the first time, has
a natural possible-world semantics for a quantified language
with equality. We then provide, for the propositional frag-
ment, a sound and complete axiomatization that faithfully
lifts Levesque’s proof theory to the many agent case. We also
discuss comparisons to the earlier approach by Halpern and
Lakemeyer.
Introduction
Levesque’s notion of only-knowing is a single agent mono-
tonic logic that was proposed with the intention of capturing
certain types of nonmonotonic reasoning. Levesque (1990)
already showed that there is a close connection to Moore’s
(1985) autoepistemic logic (AEL). Recently, Lakemeyer and
Levesque (2005) showed that only-knowing can be adapted
to capture default logic as well. The main benefit of us-
ing Levesque’s logic is that, via simple semantic arguments,
nonmonotonic conclusions can be reached without the use
of meta-logical notions such as fixpoints (Rosati 2000;
Levesque and Lakemeyer 2001) . Only-knowing is then nat-
urally of interest in a many agent context, since agents ca-
pable of non-trivial nonmonotonic behavior should believe
other agents to also be equipped with nonmonotonic mech-
anisms. For instance, if all that Bob knows is that Tweety
is a bird and a default that birds typically fly, then Alice,
if she knows all that Bob knows, concludes that Bob be-
lieves Tweety can fly.1 Also, the idea of only-knowing a
collection of sentences is useful for modeling the beliefs of
Copyright c© 2010, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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1We use the terms ”knowledge” and ”belief” interchangeably in
the paper.
a knowledge base (KB), since sentences that are not logi-
cally entailed by the KB are taken to be precisely those not
believed. If many agents are involved, and suppose Alice
has some beliefs on Bob’s KB, then she could capitalize on
Bob’s knowledge to collaborate on tasks, or plan a strategy
against him.
As a logic, Levesque’s construction is unique in the sense
that in addition to a classical epistemic operator for belief,
he introduces a modality to denote what is at most known.
This new modality has a subtle relationship to the belief
operator that makes extensions to a many agent case non-
trivial. Most extensions so far make use of arbitrary Kripke
structures, that already unwittingly discard the simplicity of
Levesque’s semantics. They also have some undesirable
properties, perhaps invoking some caution in their usage.
For instance, in a canonical model (Lakemeyer 1993), cer-
tain types of epistemic states cannot be constructed. In an-
other Kripke approach (Halpern 1993), the modalities do not
seem to interact in an intuitive manner. Although an ap-
proach by Halpern and Lakemeyer (2001) does indeed suc-
cessfully model multi-agent only-knowing, it forces us to
have the semantic notion of validity directly in the language
and has proof-theoretic constructs in the semantics via maxi-
mally consistent sets. Precisely for this reason, that proposal
is not natural, and it is matched with a proof theory that has
a set of new axioms to deal with these new notions. It is also
not clear how one can extend their semantics to the first-
order case. Lastly, an approach by Waaler (2004) avoids
such an axiomatization of validity, but the model theory also
has problems (Waaler and Solhaug 2005). Technical discus-
sions on their semantics are deferred to later.
The goal of this paper is to show that there is indeed a nat-
ural semantics for multi-agent only-knowing for the quanti-
fied language with equality. For the propositional subset,
there is also a sound and complete axiomatization that faith-
fully generalizes Levesque’s proof theory.2 We also differ
from Halpern and Lakemeyer in that we do not enrich the
language any more than necessary (modal operators for each
agent), and we do not make use of canonical Kripke models.
And while canonical models, in general, are only workable
2The proof theory for a quantified language is well known to be
incomplete for the single agent case. It is also known that any com-
plete axiomatization cannot be recursive (Halpern and Lakemeyer
1995; Levesque and Lakemeyer 2001).
semantically and can not be used in practice, our proposal
has a computational appeal to it. We also show that if we
do enrich the language with a modal operator for validity,
but only to establish a common language with (Halpern and
Lakemeyer 2001), then we agree on the set of valid sen-
tences. Finally, we obtain a first-order multi-agent gener-
alization of AEL, defined solely using notions of classical
logical entailment and theoremhood.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review
Levesque’s notions,3 and define a semantics with so-called
k-structures. We then compare the framework to earlier at-
tempts. Following that, we introduce a sound and complete
axiomatization for the propositional fragment. In the last
sections, we sketch the multi-agent (first-order) generaliza-
tion of AEL, and prove that k-structures and (Halpern and
Lakemeyer 2001) agree on valid sentences, for an enriched
language. Then, we conclude and end.
The k-structures Approach
The non-modal part of Levesque’s logic4 ONL consists of
standard first-order logic with = and a countably infinite set
of standard names N .5 To keep matters simple, function
symbols are not considered in this language. We call a predi-
cate other than =, applied to first-order variables or standard
names, an atomic formula. We write αxn to mean that the
variable x is substituted in α by a standard name. If all the
variables in a formula α are substituted by standard names,
then we call it a ground formula. Here, a world is simply a
set of ground atoms, and the semantics is defined over the
set of all possible worlds W . The standard names are thus
rigid designators, and denote precisely the same entities in
all worlds. ONL also has two modal operators: L and N .
WhileLα is to be read as ”at least α is known”,Nα is to be
read as ”at most ¬α is known”. A set of possible worlds is
referred to as the agent’s epistemic state e. Defining a model
to be the pair (e, w) for w ∈ W , components of ONL’s
meaning of truth are:
1. e, w |= p iff p ∈ w and p is a ground atom,
2. e, w |= (m = n) iffm and n are identical standard names,
3. e, w |= ¬α iff e, w 6|= α,
4. e, w |= α ∨ β iff e, w |= α or e, w |= β,
5. e, w |= ∀x. α iff e, w |= αxn for all standard names n,
6. e, w |= Lα iff for all w′ ∈ e, e, w′ |= α, and
7. e, w |= Nα iff for all w′ 6∈ e, e, w′ |= α.
The main idea is that α is (at least) believed iff it is true at all
worlds considered possible, while (at most) α is believed to
be false iff it is true at all worlds considered impossible. So,
3There are other notions of ”all I know”, which will not be
discussed here (Halpern and Moses 1985; Ben-David and Gafni
1989). Also see (Rosati 2000).
4We name the logic following (Halpern and Lakemeyer 2001)
for ease of comparisons later on. It is referred to asOL in (Halpern
and Lakemeyer 1995; Levesque and Lakemeyer 2001).
5More precisely, we have logical connectives ∨, ∀ and ¬. Other
connectives are taken for their usual syntactic abbreviations.
an agent is said to only-know α, syntactically expressed as
Lα ∧N¬α, when worlds in e are precisely those where α
is true. Halpern and Lakemeyer (2001) underline three fea-
tures of the semantical framework of ONL, the intuitions
of which we desire to maintain in the many agent setting:
1. EvaluatingNα does not affect the epistemic possibilities.
Formally, in ONL, after evaluating formulas of the form
Nα the agent’s epistemic state is still given by e.
2. A union of the agent’s possibilities, that evaluate L, and
the impossible worlds that evaluate N , is fixed and in-
dependent of e, and is the set of all conceivable states.
Formally, in ONL, Lα is evaluated wrt. worlds w ∈ e,
and Nα is evaluated wrt. worlds w ∈ W − e; the union
of which isW . The intuition is that the exact complement
of an agent’s possibilities is used in evaluating N .
3. Given any set of possibilities, there is always a model
where precisely this set is the epistemic state. Formally,
inONL, any subset ofW can be defined as the epistemic
state.
Although these notions seem clear enough in the single
agent case, generalizing them to the many agent case is non-
trivial (Halpern and Lakemeyer 2001). We shall return to
analyze the features shortly. Let us begin by extending the
language. Let ONLn be a first-order modal language that
enriches the non-modal subset of ONL with modal oper-
ators Li and Ni for i = a, b. For ease of exposition, we
only have two agents a (Alice) and b (Bob). Extensions to
more agents is straightforward. We freely use Oi, such that
Oiα is an abbreviation for Liα ∧Ni¬α, and is read as ”all
that i knows is α”. Objective and subjective formulas are
understood as follows.
Definition 1. The i-depth of a formula α, denoted |α|i, is
defined inductively as (2i denotes Li or Ni):
1. |α|i = 1 for atoms,
2. |¬α|i = |α|i,
3. |∀x. α|i = |α|i,
4. |α ∨ β|i = max(|α|i, |β|i),
5. |2iα|i = |α|i ,
6. |2jα|i = |α|j + 1, for j 6= i
A formula has a depth k if max(a-depth,b-depth) = k. A
formula is called i-objective if all epistemic operators which
do not occur within the scope of another epistemic operator
are of the form2j for i 6= j. A formula is called i-subjective
if every atom is in the scope of an epistemic operator and all
epistemic operators which do not occur within the scope of
another epistemic operator are of the form 2i.
For example, a formula of the form LaLbLap ∨ Lbq has
a depth of 4, a a-depth of 3 and a b-depth of 4. Lbq is both
b-subjective and a-objective. A formula is called objective
if it does not mention any modal operators. A formula is
called basic if it does not mention any Ni for i = a, b. We
now define a notion of epistemic states using k-structures.
The main intuition is that we keep separate the worlds Alice
believes from the worlds she considers Bob to believe, to
depth k.
Definition 2. A k-structure (k ≥ 1), say ek, for an agent is
defined inductively as:
− e1 ⊆ W × {{}},
− ek ⊆ W ×Ek−1, where Em is the set of all m-structures.
A e1 for Alice, denoted as e1a, is intended to represent
a set of worlds {〈w, {}〉, . . .}. A e2 is of the form
{〈w, e1b〉, 〈w′, e′1b〉, . . .}, and it is to be read as ”at w, she
believes Bob considers worlds from e1b possible but at w
′,
she believes Bob to consider worlds from e′1b possible”.
This conveys the idea that Alice has only partial informa-
tion about Bob, and so at different worlds, her beliefs about
what Bob knows differ. We define a ek for Alice, a ej for
Bob and a world w ∈ W as a (k, j)-model (eka, ejb, w). Only
sentences of a maximal a-depth of k, and a maximal b-depth
of j are interpreted wrt. a (k, j)-model. The complete se-
mantic definition is:
1. eka, e
j
b, w |= p iff p ∈ w and p is a ground atom,
2. eka, e
j
b, w |= (m = n) iff m,n ∈ N and are identical,
3. eka, e
j
b, w |= ¬α iff eka, ejb, w 6|= α,
4. eka, e
j
b, w |= α ∨ β iff eka, ejb, w |= α or eka, ejb, w |= β,
5. eka, e
j
b, w |= ∀x. α iff eka, ejb, w |= αxn for all n ∈ N ,
6. eka, e
j
b, w |= Laα iff for all 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 ∈ eka,
eka, e
k−1
b , w
′ |= α,
7. eka, e
j
b, w |= Naα iff for all 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 6∈ eka,
eka, e
k−1
b , w
′ |= α
And since Oaα syntactically denotes Laα ∧Na¬α, it fol-
lows from the semantics that
8. eka, e
j
b, w |= Oaα iff for all worlds w′, for all ek−1 for
Bob, 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 ∈ eka iff eka, ek−1b , w′ |= α
(The semantics for Lbα and Nbα are given analogously.)
A formula α (of a-depth of k and of b-depth of j) is sat-
isfiable iff there is a (k, j)-model such that eka, e
j
b, w |= α.
The formula is valid (|= α) iff α is true at all (k, j)-models.
Satisfiability is extended to a set of formulas Σ (of maximal
a, b-depth of k, j) in the manner that there is a (k, j)-model
eka, e
j
b, w such that e
k
a, e
j
b, w |= α′ for every α′ ∈ Σ. We
write Σ |= α to mean that for every (k, j)-model eka, ejb, w,
if eka, e
j
b, w |= α′ for all α′ ∈ Σ, then eka, ejb, w |= α.
Validity is not affected if models of a depth greater than
that needed are used. This is to say, if α is true wrt. all
(k, j)-models, then α is true wrt. all (k′, j′)-models for k′ ≥
k, j′ ≥ j. We obtain this result by constructing for every ek′a ,
a k-structure ea↓k
′
k , such that they agree on all formulas of
maximal a-depth k. Analogously for ej
′
b .
Definition 3. Given ek
′
a , we define ea↓k
′
k for k
′ ≥ k ≥ 1:
1. ea↓11 = e1a,
2. ea↓k′1 = {〈w, {}〉 | 〈w, ek
′−1
b 〉 ∈ ek
′
a },
3. ea↓k
′
k = {〈w, eb↓k
′−1
k−1 〉 | 〈w, ek
′−1
b 〉 ∈ ek
′
a }.
Lemma 4. For all formulas α of maximal a, b-depth of k, j,
ek
′
a , e
j′
b , w |= α iff ea↓k
′
k , eb↓j
′
j , w |= α, for k′ ≥ k, j′ ≥ j.
Proof. By induction on the depth of formulas. The proof im-
mediately holds for atomic formulas, disjunctions and nega-
tions since we have the same world w. Assume that the re-
sult holds for formulas of a, b-depth 1. Let α such a formula,
and suppose ek
′
a , e
j′
b , w |= Laα (where Laα has a, b-depth
of 1, 2). Then, for all 〈w′, ek′−1b 〉 ∈ ek
′
a , e
k′
a , e
k′−1
b , w
′ |=
α iff (by induction hypothesis) ea↓k′1 , eb↓k
′−1
1 , w
′ |= α
iff ea↓k′2 , {}, w |= Laα. By construction, we also have
ea↓k′1 , {}, w |= Laα. Lastly, since Laα is a-subjective, b’s
structure is irrelevant, and thus, ea↓k′1 , eb↓j
′
2 , w |= Laα.
For the reverse direction, suppose ea↓k′1 , eb↓j
′
2 , w |= Laα.
Then for all w′ ∈ ea↓k′1 , ea↓k
′
1 , {}, w′ |= α iff (by con-
struction) for all 〈w′, ek′−1b 〉 ∈ ek
′
a , e
k′
a , e
k′−1
b , w
′ |= α iff
ek
′
a , {}, w |= Laα. Since b’s structure is irrelevant, we have
ek
′
a , e
j′
b , w |= Laα. The cases for Lbα, Naα and Nbα are
completely symmetric. 
Theorem 5. For all formulas α of a, b-depth of k, j, if α is
true at all (k, j)-models, then α is true at all (k′, j′)-models
with k′ ≥ k and j′ ≥ j.
Proof. Suppose α is true at all (k, j)-models. Given any
(k′, j′)-model, by assumption ea↓k
′
k , eb↓j
′
j , w |= α and by
Lemma 4, ek
′
a , e
j′
b , w |= α. 
Knowledge with k-structures satisfy weak S5 properties,
and the Barcan formula (Hughes and Cresswell 1972).
Lemma 6. If α is a formula, the following are valid
wrt. models of appropriate depth (2i denotes Li or Ni):
1. 2iα ∧2i(α ⊃ β) ⊃ 2iβ,
2. 2iα ⊃ 2i2iα,
3. ¬2iα ⊃ 2i¬2iα,
4. ∀x. 2iα ⊃ 2i(∀x. α).
Proof. The proofs are similar. For item 3, wlog let2i beLa.
Suppose eka, e
j
b, w |= ¬Laα. There is some 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 ∈ eka
such that eka, e
k−1
b , w
′ |= ¬α. Let w′′ be any world such
that 〈w′′, e′k−1b 〉 ∈ eka. Then, eka, e′k−1b , w′′ |= ¬Laα. Thus,
eka, e
j
b, w |= La¬Laα. The case of Na is analogous. 
Before moving on, let us briefly reflect on the fact that k-
structures have finite depth. So suppose a only-knows KB,
of depth k. Using k-structures allows us to reason about
what is believed, up to depth k. Also, if we construct epis-
temic states from k′-structures where k′ ≥ k, then the logic
correctly captures non-beliefs beyond the depth k. To illus-
trate, let true (depth 1) be all that a knows. Then, it can eas-
ily be shown that both the sentencesOa(true) ⊃ ¬La¬Lbα
and Oa(true) ⊃ ¬LaLbα are valid sentences in the logic,
by considering any e2 (and higher) for a. For most purposes,
this restriction of having a parameter k seems harmless in the
sense that agents usually have a finite knowledge base with
sentences of some maximal depth k and they should not be
able to conclude anything about what is known at depths
higher than k, with one exception. If we were to include
a notion of common knowledge (Fagin et al. 1995), then
we would get entailments about what is believed at arbitrary
depths. With our current model, this cannot be captured, but
we are willing to pay that price because in return we get,
for the first time, a very simple possible-world style account
of only-knowing. Similarly, we have nothing to say about
(infinite) knowledge bases with unbounded depth.
Multi-Agent Only-Knowing
In this section, we return to the features of only-knowing dis-
cussed earlier and verify that the new semantics reasonably
extends them to the multi-agent case. We also briefly discuss
earlier attempts at capturing these features. Halpern (1993),
Lakemeyer (1993), and Halpern and Lakemeyer (2001) in-
dependently attempted to extend ONL to the many agent
case.6 There are some subtle differences in their approaches,
but the main restriction is they only allow a propositional
language. Henceforth, to make the comparison feasible, we
shall also speak of the propositional subset of ONLn with
the understanding that the semantical framework is now de-
fined for propositions (from an infinite set Φ) rather than
ground atoms.
The main component in these features is the notion of
possibility. In the single agent case, each world represents
a possibility. Thus, from a logical viewpoint, a possibil-
ity is simply the set of objective formulas true at some
world. Further, the set of epistemic possibilities is given
by {{objective formulas true at w} | w ∈ e}. Halpern and
Lakemeyer (2001) correctly argue that the appropriate gen-
eralization of the notion of possibility in the many agent case
are i-objective formulas. Intuitively, a possible state of af-
fairs according to a include the state of the world (objective
formulas), as well as what b is taken to believe. The ear-
lier attempts by Halpern and Lakemeyer use Kripke struc-
tures with accessibility relations Ki for each agent i. Given
a Kripke structure M , the notion of possibility is defined as
the set of i-objective formulas true at some Kripke world,
and the set of epistemic possibilities is obtained from the i-
objective formulas true at all i-accessible worlds. Formally,
the set of epistemic possibilities true at (M,w), where w is
a world in M , is defined as {obj+i (M,w′) | w′ ∈ Ki(w)},
where obj+i (M,w
′) is a set consisting of i-objective formu-
las true at (M,w′).7 Although intuitive, note that, even for
the propositional subset of ONL, a Kripke world is a com-
pletely different entity from what Levesque supposes. Per-
haps, one consequence is that the semantic proofs in earlier
approaches are very involved. In contrast, we define worlds
exactly as Levesque supposes. And, our notion of possibil-
ity is obtained from the set of a-objective formulas true at
each 〈w, ek−1b 〉 in eka.
6For space reasons, we do not review all aspects of these ap-
proaches.
7The superscript + denotes that the set includes non-basic for-
mulas. Given X+, we let X = {φ is basic | φ ∈ X+}.
Definition 7. Suppose M = (eka, e
j
b, w) is a (k, j)-model.
1. let obj+i (M) = {i-objective φ |M |= φ},
2. let Obj+a (e
k
a) = {obj+a ({}, ek−1b , w) | 〈w, ek−1b 〉 ∈ eka},
3. let Obj+b (e
j
b) = {obj+b (ej−1a , {}, w) | 〈w, ej−1a 〉 ∈ ejb}.
All the a-objective formulas true at a model M , essentially
the objective formulas true wrt. w and the b-subjective
formulas true wrt. ejb, are given by obj
+
a (M). Note that
these formulas do not strictly correspond to a’s possibilities.
Rather, we define Obj+a on her epistemic state e
k
a, and
this gives us all the a-objectives formulas that a considers
possible. We shall now argue that the intuition of all of
Levesque’s properties is maintained.8
Property 1. In the single agent case, this property ensured
that an agent’s epistemic possibilities are not affected on
evaluating N . This is immediately the case here. Given
a model, say (eka, e
j
b, w), a’s epistemic possibilities are de-
termined by Obj+a (e
k
a). To evaluate Naα, we consider all
models (eka, e
k−1
b , w
′) such that 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 6∈ eka. Again, a’s
possibilities are given byObj+a (e
k
a) for all these models, and
does not change.
Property 2. In the single agent case, this property ensured
that evaluating Lα and Nα is always wrt. the set of all pos-
sibilities, and completely independent of e. As discussed, in
the many agent case, possibilities mean i-objective formulas
and analogously, if α is a possibility in a’s view, say an a-
objective formula of maximal b-depth of k, then we should
interpret Laα and Naα wrt. all a-objective possibilities of
max. depth k: the set of (k+ 1)-structures. Clearly then, the
result is fixed and independent of the corresponding ek+1.
The following lemma is a direct consequence of the defini-
tion of the semantics.
Lemma 8. Let α be a i-objective formula of j-depth k, for
j 6= i. Then, the set of k+1-structures that evaluate Liα
and Niα is Ek+1.
Property 3. The third property ensures that one can charac-
terize epistemic states from any set of i-objective formulas.
Intuitively, given such a set, we must have a model where
precisely this set is the epistemic state. Earlier attempts at
clarifying this property involved constructing a set of max-
imally K45n-consistent sets of basic i-objective formulas,
and showing that there exist an epistemic state that precisely
corresponds to this set. But, defining possibilities via K45n
proof-theoretic machinery inevitably leads to some limita-
tions, as we shall see. We instead proceed semantically, and
go beyond basic formulas. Let Ω be a satisfiable set of i-
objective formulas, say of maximal j-depth k, for j 6= i. Let
Ω′ be a set obtained by adding a i-objective formula γ of
maximal j-depth k such that Ω′ is also satisfiable. By con-
sidering all i-objective formulas of maximal j-depth k, let
8It is interesting to note that such a formulation of Levesque’s
properties is not straightforward in the first-order case. That is,
for the quantified language, it is known that there are epistemic
states that can not be characterized using only objective formulas
(Levesque and Lakemeyer 2001). Thus, it is left open how one
must correctly generalize the features of first-order ONL.
us construct Ω′, Ω′′, . . . by adding formulas iff the resultant
set remains satisfiable. When we are done, the resulting Ω∗
is what we shall call a maximally satisfiable i-objective set.9
Naturally, there may be many such sets corresponding to Ω.
We show that given a set of maximally satisfiable i-objective
sets, there is a model where precisely this set characterizes
the epistemic state.
Theorem 9. Let Si be a set of maximally satisfiable sets of
i-objective formulas, and σ a satisfiable objective formula.
Suppose Sa is of max. b-depth k − 1 and Sb is of max. a-
depth j − 1. Then there is a model M∗ = 〈e∗ka, e∗jb, w∗〉
such that M∗ |= σ, Sa = Obj+a (e∗ka) and Sb = Obj+b (e∗jb).
Proof. Consider Sa. Each S′ ∈ Sa is a maximally satis-
fiable a-objective set, and thus by definition, there is a k-
structure 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 such that {}, ek−1b , w′ |= S′. Define
such a set of k-structures {〈w′, ek−1b 〉}, corresponding to
each S′ ∈ Sa, and let this be e∗ka. It is immediate to ver-
ify that Obj+a (e
∗k
a) = Sa. Analogously, for e
∗j
b using Sb.
Finally, there is clearly some world w∗ where σ holds. 
On Validity
How does the semantics compare to earlier approaches? In
particular, we are interested in valid formulas. Lakemeyer
(1993) proposes a semantics using K45n-canonical models,
but he shows that the formula ¬Oa¬Obp for any proposition
p is valid. Intuitively, it says that all that Alice knows is that
Bob does not only know p, and as Lakemeyer argues, the va-
lidity of ¬Oa¬Obp is unintuitive. After all, Bob could hon-
estly tell Alice that he does not only know p. The negation
of this formula, on the other hand, is satisfiable in a Kripke
structure approach by Halpern (1993), called the i-set ap-
proach.10 It is also satisfiable in the k-structure semantics.
Interestingly, the i-set approach and k-structures agree on
one more notion. The formula La⊥ ⊃ ¬Na¬Ob¬Oap (ζ)
is valid in both, while ¬ζ is satisfiable wrt. Lakemeyer
(1993). (It turns out that the validity of ζ in our seman-
tical framework is implicitly related to the satisfiability of
Ob¬Oap, so this property is not unreasonable.)
However, we immediately remark that the i-set approach
and k-structures do not share too many similarities beyond
those presented above. In fact, the i-set approach does
not truly satisfy Levesque’s second property. For instance,
Na¬Obp∧La¬Obp (λ) is satisfiable in Halpern (1993). Re-
call that, in this property, the union of models that evaluate
Niα andLiαmust lead to all conceivable states. So, the sat-
isfiability of λ leaves open the question as to whyObp is not
considered since ¬Obp is true at all conceivable states. We
show that, in contrast, λ is not satisfiable in the k-structures
approach. Lastly, (Halpern and Lakemeyer 2001) involves
enriching the language, the intuitions of which are perhaps
9A maximally satisfiable set is to be understood as a semanti-
cally characterized complete description of a possibility, analogous
to a proof theoretically characterized notion of maximally consis-
tent set of formulas.
10In his original formulation, Halpern (1993) constructs trees.
We build on discussions in (Halpern and Lakemeyer 2001).
best explained after reviewing the proof theory, and so we
defer discussions to later.11
Theorem 10. The following are properties of the semantics:
1. Oa¬Obp, for any p ∈ Φ, is satisfiable.
2. |= La⊥ ⊃ ¬Na¬Ob¬Oap.
3. Na¬Obp ∧La¬Obp is not satisfiable.
Proof. Item 1. Let Wp = {w | w |= p} and let E be all
subsets ofW except the setWp. It is easy to see that if e1b ∈
E, then {}, e1b , w 6|= Obp, for any world w. Now, define a e2
for a that has all ofW × E. Thus, e2a, {}, w |= Oa¬Obp.
Item 2. Suppose eka, {}, w |= La⊥ for any w ∈ W .
Then, for all 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 ∈ eka, eka, ek−1b , w′ |= ⊥, and thus,
eka = {}. Suppose now eka, {}, w |= Na¬Ob¬Oap. Then,
wrt. all of 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 6∈ eka i.e. all of Ek, ¬Ob¬Oap must
hold. That is, ¬Ob¬Oap must be valid. From above, we
know this is not the case.
Item 3. Suppose eka, {}, w |= La¬Obp, for any w. Then,
for all 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 ∈ eka, eka, ek−1b , w′ |= ¬Obp. Since Obp is
satisfiable, there is a e∗k−1b such that {}, e∗k−1b , w∗ |= Obp,
and 〈w∗, e∗k−1b 〉 6∈ eka. Then, eka, {}, w |= ¬Na¬Obp. 
Thus, k-structures seem to satisfy our intuitions on the be-
havior of only-knowing. To understand why, notice that
¬Oa¬Obp and λ involve the nesting ofNi operators. Lake-
meyer (1993) makes an unavoidable technical commitment.
A (i-objective) possibility is formally a maximally K45n-
consistent set of basic i-objective formulas. The restriction
to basic formulas is an artifact of a semantics based on the
canonical model. Unfortunately, there is more to agent i’s
possibility than just basic formulas. In the case of Halpern
(1993), the problem seems to be that Ni and Li do not in-
teract naturally, and that the full complement of epistemic
possibilities is not considered in interpreting Ni. In con-
trast, Theorem 9 shows that we allow non-basic formulas
and by using a strictly semantic notion, we avoid problems
that arise from the proof-theoretic restrictions. And, since
the semantics faithfully complies with the second property,
λ is not satisfiable.
The natural question is if there are axioms that character-
ize the semantics. We begin, in the next section, with a proof
theory by Lakemeyer (1993) that is known to be sound and
complete for all attempts so far, but for a restricted language.
Proof Theory
In the single agent case, ONL’s proof theory consists of
axioms of propositional logic, axioms that treat L and N
as a classical belief operator in K45, an axiom that allows
us to use N and L freely on subjective formulas, modus
ponens (MP) and necessitation (NEC) for both L and N
as inference rules, and the following axiom:12
11An approach by (Waaler 2004; Waaler and Solhaug 2005) is
also motivated by the proof theory. Discussions are deferred.
12Strictly speaking, this is not the proof theory introduced
in (Levesque 1990), where an axiom replaces the inference rule
NEC. Here, we consider an equivalent formulation by Halpern
and Lakemeyer (2001).
A5.Nα ⊃ ¬Lα if ¬α is a propositionally consistent
objective formula.
As we shall see, only the axiom A5 is controversial, since
extending any objective α to any i-objective α is problem-
atic. Mainly, the soundness of the axiom in the single agent
case relies on propositional logic. But in the multi-agent
case, since we go beyond propositional formulas establish-
ing this consistency is non-trivial, and even circular. To this
end, Lakemeyer (1993) proposes to resolve this consistency
by relying on the existing logic K45n. As a consequence,
his proof theoretic formulation appropriately generalizes all
of Levesque’s axioms, except forA5where its application is
restricted to only basic i-objective consistent formulas. We
use ` to denote provability.
Definition 11. ONL−n consists of all formulas α inONLn
such that no Nj may occur in the scope of a Li or a Ni, for
i 6= j.
The following axioms, along with MP and NEC (for Li
andNi) is an axiomatization that we refer to asAXn. AXn
is sound and complete for the canonical model and the i-set
approach for formulas in ONL−n .
A1n. All instances of propositional logic,
A2n. Li(α ⊃ β) ⊃ (Liα ⊃ Liβ),
A3n.Ni(α ⊃ β) ⊃ (Niα ⊃Niβ),
A4n. σ ⊃ Liσ ∧Niσ for i-subjective σ,
A5n.Niα ⊃ ¬Liα if ¬α is a K45n-consistent
i-objective basic formula.
Observe that, as discussed, the soundness of A5n is built
on K45n-consistency. Since our semantics is not based on
Kripke structures, proving that every K45n-consistent for-
mula is satisfiable in some (k, j)-model is not immediate.
We propose a construction called the (k, j)-correspondence
model. In the following, in order to disambiguate W from
Kripke worlds, we shall refer to our worlds as propositional
valuations.
Definition 12. The K45n canonical model M c =
〈Wc, pic,Kca,Kcb〉 is defined as follows:
1. Wc = {w | w is a (basic) maximally consistent set }
2. for all p ∈ Φ and worlds w, pic(w)(p) = true iff p ∈ w
3. (w,w′) ∈ Kci iff w\Li ⊆ w′, w\Li = {α | Liα ∈ w}
Definition 13. Given M c, define a set of propositional val-
uations W such that for each world w ∈ Wc, there is a
valuation JwK ∈ W , JwK = {p | p ∈ w}.
Definition 14. Given M c and a world w ∈ Wc, construct a
(k, j)-model 〈eJwKka, eJwKjb, JwK〉 from valuations W induc-
tively:
1. eJwK1a = {〈Jw′K, {}〉 | w′ ∈ Kca(w)},
2. eJwKka = {〈Jw′K, eJw′Kk−1b 〉 | w′ ∈ Kca(w)},
where eJw′Kk−1b = {〈Jw′′K, eJw′′Kk−2a 〉 | w′′ ∈ Kcb(w′)}.
Further, eJwKjb is constructed analogously. Let us refer to
this model as the (k, j)-correspondence model of (M c, w).
Roughly, Defn. 14 is a construction of a (k, j)-model
that appeals to the accessibility relations in the canonical
model.13 Thus, a e1a for Alice wrt. w has precisely the val-
uations of Kripke worlds w′ ∈ Kca(w). Quite analogously,
a eka is a set {〈Jw′K, ek−1〉}, where w′ ∈ Kca(w) as before,
but ek−1 is an epistemic state for Bob and hence refers all
worlds w′′ ∈ Kcb(w′). By a induction on the depth of a basic
formula α, we obtain a theorem that α of maximal a, b-depth
k, j is satisfiable at (M c, w) iff the (k, j)-correspondence
model satisfies the formula.
Theorem 15. For all basic formulas α in ONL−n and of
maximal a, b-depth of k, j,
M c, w |= α iff eJwKka, eJwKjb, JwK |= α.
Proof. By definition, the proof holds for propositional for-
mulas, disjunctions and negations. So let us say the re-
sult holds for formulas of a, b-depth 1. Suppose now
M c, w |= Laα, where Laα has a, b-depth of 1, 2. Then
for all w′ ∈ Kca(w), M c, w′ |= α iff (by induction hypothe-
sis) eJw′K1a, eJw′K1b , Jw′K |= α iff eJwK2a, {}, JwK |= Laα. By
construction, we also have eJwK1a, {}, JwK |= Laα. Since
b’s structure is irrelevant, we get eJwK1a, eJwK2b , JwK |= Laα
proving the hypothesis.
For the other direction, suppose eJwK1a, eJwK2b , JwK |=
Laα. For all Jw′K ∈ eJwK1a, eJwK1a, {}, Jw′K |= α iff (by
hyp.) M c, w′ |= α for all w′ ∈ Kca(w) iff M c, w |= Laα.
Lemma 16. Every K45n-consistent basic formula α is sat-
isfiable wrt. some (k, j)-model.
Proof. It is a property of the canonical model that every
K45n-consistent basic formula is satisfiable wrt. the canon-
ical model. Supposing that the formula has a a, b-depth of
k, j then from Thm 15, we know there is at least the corre-
spondence (k, j)-model that also satisfies the formula. 
Theorem 17. For all α ∈ ONL−n , if AXn ` α then |= α.
Proof. The soundness is easily shown to hold for A1n −
A4n. The soundness of A5n is shown by induction on
the depth. Suppose α is a propositional formula, and say
¬α is a consistent propositional formula (and hence K45n-
consistent). Then there is a world w∗ such that {}, {}, w∗ |=
¬α. Given a eka, if 〈w∗, ek−1b 〉 ∈ eka for some ek−1b , then
eka, {}, w |= ¬Laα for any worldw. If not, then eka, {}, w |=¬Naα. Thus, eka, {}, w |= Naα ⊃ ¬Laα. Wlog, as-
sume the proof holds for a-objective formulas of max. b-
depth k − 1. Suppose now, α is such a formula, and ¬α is
K45n-consistent. By Lemma 16, there is 〈w∗, e∗k−1b 〉, such
that {}, e∗k−1b , w∗ |= ¬α. Again, if 〈w∗, e∗k−1b 〉 ∈ eka, then
eka, {}, w |= ¬Laα and if not, then eka, {}, w |= ¬Naα. 
We proceed with the completeness over the following defi-
nition, and lemmas.
13The construction is somewhat similar to the notion of gener-
ated submodels of Kripke frames (Hughes and Cresswell 1984).
Definition 18. A formula ψ is said to be independent of the
formula φ wrt. an axiom system AX , if neither AX ` φ ⊃
ψ nor AX ` φ ⊃ ¬ψ.
Lemma 19 (Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001). If φ1, . . . , φm
are K45n-consistent basic i-objective formulas then there
exists a basic i-objective formula ψ of the formLjψ′ (j 6= i)
that is independent of φ1, . . . , φm wrt. K45n.
Lemma 20. In the lemma above, if φi are i-objective and
of maximal j-depth k for j 6= i, then there is a ψ of j-depth
2k + 2.
Lemma 21 (Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001). If φ and ψ
are i-objective basic formulas, and if Liφ ∧Niψ is AXn-
consistent, then φ ∨ ψ is valid.
Lemma 22 (Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001). Every formula
α ∈ ONLn is provably equivalent to one in the normal
form (written below for n = {a, b}):∨
(σ ∧ Laϕa0 ∧ ¬Laϕa1 . . . ∧ ¬Laϕam1 ∧ Lbϕb0 . . . ∧¬Lbϕbm2∧Naψa0 . . .∧¬Naψan1∧Nbψb0 . . .∧¬Nbψbn2)
where σ is a propositional formula, and ϕim and ψin are i-
objective. If α ∈ ONL−n , ϕim and ψin are basic.
Theorem 23. For all formulas α ∈ ONL−n , if |= α then
AXn ` α.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that every AXn-consistent
formula ξ is satisfiable wrt. some (k, j)-model. If ξ is basic,
then by Lemma 16, the statement holds. If ξ is not basic,
then wlog, it can be considered in the normal form:∨
(σ ∧ Laϕa0 ∧ ¬Laϕa1 . . . ∧ ¬Laϕam1 ∧ Lbϕb0 . . . ∧¬Lbϕbm2∧Naψa0 . . .∧¬Naψan1∧Nbψb0 . . .∧¬Nbψbn2)
where σ is a propositional formula, and ϕim and ψin are i-
objective and basic. Since σ is propositional and consistent,
there is clearly a world w∗ such that w∗ |= σ. We construct
a k′-structure such that it satisfies all the a-subjective formu-
las in the normal form above. Following that, a j′-structure
for all the b-subjective formulas is constructed identically.
The resulting (k′, j′)-model (with w∗) satisfies ξ.
Let A be all K45n-consistent formulas of the form ϕa0 ∧
ψa0∧¬ϕaj (for j ≥ 1) or the form ϕa0∧ψa0∧¬ψaj . Let γ
be independent of all formulas inA, as in Lemma 19 and 20.
Note that, while we take ξ itself to be of maximal a, b-depth
of k, j, the depth of ϕa0, . . . being a-objective are of max-
imal b-depth k − 1, and hence γ is of b-depth 2k (Lemma
20). Given a consistent set of formulas, the standard Lin-
denbaum construction can be used to construct a maximally
consistent set of formulas, all of a maximal b-depth k − 1.
That is, a formula is considered in the construction only if
it has a maximal b-depth k − 1. Now, let Sa be a set of all
maximally consistent sets of formulas, constructed by only
considering formulas of maximal b-depth k − 1, and con-
taining ϕa0 ∧ (¬ψa0 ∨ (ψa0 ∧ γ)). Since each of these con-
sistent sets are basic and a-objective, they are satisfiable by
Lemma 16. Thus the sets S′ ∈ Sa are satisfiable wrt. 2k-
structures 〈w, e2kb 〉. Let k′ = 2k + 1. By constructing a
k′-structure for Alice, say ek
′
a , from each 〈w, e2kb 〉 for every
S′ ∈ Sa, we have that Obja(ek
′
a ) = Sa. We shall show that
all the a-subjective formulas in the normal form are satisfied
wrt. 〈ek′a , {}, w∗〉.
Since for all S′ ∈ Sa, we have ϕa0 ∈ S′ we get that
ek
′
a , {}, w∗ |= Laϕa0. Now, since Laϕa0 ∧ ¬Laϕaj is con-
sistent, it must be that ϕa0 ∧ ¬ϕaj is consistent. For sup-
pose not, then ¬ϕa0 ∨ ϕaj is provable and thus, we have
ϕa0 ⊃ ϕaj . We then prove Laϕa0 ⊃ Laϕaj , and since
we have Laϕa0 we prove Laϕaj , clearly inconsistent with
Laϕa0 ∧ ¬Laϕaj . Now that ϕa0 ∧ ¬ϕaj is consistent, we
either have that ϕa0 ∧¬ϕaj ∧ψa0 or ϕa0 ∧¬ϕaj ∧¬ψa0 is
consistent. With the former, we also have that ϕa0 ∧¬ϕaj ∧
ψa0 ∧ γ is consistent. There are maximally consistent sets
that contain one of them, both of which contain ¬ϕaj . This
means that, ek
′
a , {}, w∗ |= ¬Laϕaj .
Now, consider some k′-structure 〈w•, e•2kb 〉 6∈ ek
′
a . One
of the following a-objective formulas must hold wrt. this k′-
structure: (a) ϕa0 ∧ψa0, (b) ϕa0 ∧¬ψa0, (c) ¬ϕa0 ∧ψa0 or
(d) ¬ϕa0 ∧ ¬ψa0. It can not be (d), since Laϕa0 ∧Naψa0
is consistent, and this implies that ϕa0 ∨ ψa0 is valid (by
Lemma 21). It certainly cannot be (b), for it would be in
some S′ ∈ Sa. This leaves us with options (c) and (a), both
of which have ¬ψa0. Since the k′-structure was arbitrary, we
must have for all 〈w, e2kb 〉 6∈ ek
′
a , {}, e2kb , w |= ψa0. Thus,
ek
′
a , {}, w∗ |= Naψa0.
Finally, since Naψa0 ∧ ¬Naψaj is consistent, it must be
that ψa0 ∧ ¬ψaj is consistent. Further, either ψa0 ∧ ¬ψaj ∧
ϕa0 or ψa0 ∧ ¬ψaj ∧ ¬ϕa0 is consistent. If the former, then
ψa0∧¬ψaj∧ϕa0∧¬γ is also consistent. Let β be that which
is consistent. Note that ¬β ∧ (ϕa0 ∧ (¬ψa0 ∨ (ψa0 ∧ γ)))
is consistent, and hence part of all S′ ∈ Sa. This means that
ek
′
a , {}, w∗ |= La(¬β). But since β itself is consistent, there
is a k′-structure such that {}, e•(b,2k), w• |= β. And this k′-
structure can not be in ek
′
a . This means that e
k′
a , {}, w∗ |=¬Naψaj . Thus, all the a-subjective formulas in the normal
form above are satisfiable wrt. ek
′
a . 
Now, observe that, although La⊥ ⊃ ¬Na¬Ob¬Oap (ζ)
from Theorem 10 is valid, yet it is not derivable from AXn.
In fact, the soundness result is easily extended to the full
language ONLn. Then, the proof theory cannot be com-
plete for the full language since there is ζ ∈ ONLn such
that 6` ζ and |= ζ. Similarly, the validity of non-provable
formulas ¬Oa¬Obp and ζ wrt. the canonical model and the
i-set approach respectively, show that although AXn is also
sound for the full language in these approaches, it cannot be
compelete. Mainly, axiom A5n has to somehow go beyond
basic formulas. As Halpern and Lakemeyer (2001) discuss,
the problem is one of circularity. We would like the axiom
to hold for any α such that it is a consistent i-objective for-
mula, but to deal with consistency we have to clarify what
the axiom system looks like.
The approach taken by Halpern and Lakemeyer is to intro-
duce validity (and its dual satisfiability) directly into the lan-
guage. Formulas in the new language, ONL+n , are shown
to be provably equivalent to ONLn. Some new axioms
involving validity and satisfiability are added to the axiom
system, and the resultant proof theory AX+n is shown to
be sound and complete for formulas in ONL+n , wrt. an ex-
tended canonical model. (An extended canonical model fol-
lows the spirit of the canonical model construction but by
considering maximally AX+n -consistent sets, and treat Li
and Ni as two independent modal operators.) So, one ap-
proach is to show that for formulas in the extended language
the set of valid formulas overlap in the extended canonical
model and k-structures. But then, as we argued, axiomatiz-
ing validity is not natural. Also, the proof theory is difficult
to use. And in the end, we would still understand the ax-
ioms to characterize a semantics bridged on proof-theoretic
elements.
Again, what is desired is a generalization of Levesque’s
axiom A5, and nothing more. To this end, we propose a
new axiom system, that is subtly related to the structure of
formulas as are parameters k and j. The axiom system has
an additional t-axioms, and is to correspond to a sequence
of languages ONLtn.14
Definition 24. Let ONL1n = ONL−n . Let ONLt+1n be all
Boolean combinations of formulas of ONLtn and formulas
of the form Liα and Niα for α ∈ ONLtn.
It is not hard to see that ONLt+1n ⊇ ONLtn. Note that t
here does not correspond to the depth of formulas. Indeed, a
formula of the form (LbLa)k+1p is already in ONL−n . Let
AXt+1n be an axiom system consisting ofA1n−A4n,MP,
NEC and A51n −A5t+1n defined inductively as:
A51n.Niα ⊃ ¬Liα, if ¬α is a K45n-consistent
i-objective basic formula.
A5t+1n .Niα ⊃ ¬Liα, if ¬α ∈ ONLtn, is i-objective,
and consistent wrt. A1n −A4n, A51n −A5tn .
Theorem 25. For all α ∈ ONLtn, if AXtn ` α then |= α.
Proof. We prove by induction on t. The case of AX1n is
identical to Theorem 17. So, for the induction hypothesis,
let us assume that wrt. AXtn, if AX
t
n ` β for β ∈ ONLtn
then |= β. Now, suppose that ¬α is consistent wrt.AXtn and
is a-objective. This implies that 6|= α. Thus, there is some
k-structure 〈w∗, e∗kb 〉 such that {}, e∗kb , w∗ |= ¬α. Suppose
now 〈w∗, e∗kb 〉 ∈ ek+1a then ek+1a , {}, w′ |= ¬Laα and if not
then ek+1a , {}, w′ |= ¬Naα. Thus, ek+1a , {}, w′ |= Naα ⊃
¬Laα, demonstrating the soundness of AXt+1n . 
We establish completeness in a manner identical to Theorem
23, and thus it necessary to ensure that Lemma 19, 20 and
21 hold for non-basic formulas.
Lemma 26. If φ1, . . . , φm are AXtn-consistent i-objective
formulas, then there is a basic formula ψ of the form Ljψ
(j 6= i) that is independent of φ1, . . . , φm wrt. AXtn.
Proof. Suppose that φi are a-objective and of maximal b-
depth k. A formula ψ of the form (LbLa)k+1p (where
p ∈ Φ is in the scope of k + 1 LbLa) is shown to be in-
dependent of φ1, . . . , φm. Let us suppose we can derive a γ
14The idea was also suggested by a reviewer in (Halpern and
Lakemeyer 2001) for an axiomatic characterization of the extended
canonical model, although its completeness was left open.
of the form LbLaLbLa . . . p of maximal depth k, to show
that neither ` γ ⊃ ψ nor ` γ ⊃ ¬ψ. Given any formula,
the only axioms in AXtn that can introduce γ in the scope of
modal operators isA4n andA5tn. ApplyingA4n givesLbγ
or Nbγ, and then using the axiom again we have LbLbγ
or LbNbγ. It is easy to see that the resulting formulas are
clearly independent from ψ. Applying A5tn on the other
hand, allows us to derive ` γ ⊃ Naγ or ` γ ⊃ ¬Laγ (γ
is consistent wrt. AXtn and hence also wrt. A5
t−1
n ). Again,
we could show ` γ ⊃ ¬Lb¬Laγ. Continuing this way, it
might only be possible to derive ¬Lb¬La . . .LbLa . . . p of
depth 2k + 2, that is indeed independent of ψ. 
Lemma 27. If φ and ψ are i-objective formulas, φ, ψ ∈
ONLtn and Liφ∧Niψ is AXt+1n -consistent then |= φ∨ψ.
Proof. Suppose not. Then ¬φ ∧ ¬ψ is AXtn-consistent,
and by A5t+1n we prove Na(φ ∨ ψ) ⊃ ¬La(φ ∨ ψ), and
thus, Naψ ⊃ ¬Laφ, and this is not AXt+1n -consistent with
Laφ ∧Naψ. 
Theorem 28. For all α ∈ ONLtn, if |= α then AXtn ` α.
Proof. Proof by induction on t. It is sufficient to show that
if a formula β ∈ ONLt+1n is AXt+1n -consistent then it is
satisfiable wrt. some model. We already have the proof for
ONL1n (see Theorem 23). Let us assume the proof holds
for all formulas α ∈ ONLtn. Particularly, this means that
any formula that is AXtn-consistent is satisfiable wrt. some
(k′, j′)-model. Let α ∈ ONLt+1n (say of maximal a, b-
depth of k + 1, j + 1), and suppose that α is consistent
wrt. AXt+1n . It is sufficient to show that α is satisfiable.
Wlog, we take it in the normal form:∨
(σ ∧ Laϕa0 ∧ ¬Laϕa1 . . . ∧ ¬Laϕam1 ∧ Lbϕb0 . . . ∧¬Lbϕbm2∧Naψa0 . . .∧¬Naψan1∧Nbψb0 . . .∧¬Nbψbn2).
Note that, by definition, it must be that all of ϕim, ψin are
at most in ONLtn (i.e. they may also be in ONLt−1n , . . .),
and i-objective. We proceed as we did for Theorem 23
but without restricting to basic formulas. Let A be all
AXtn-consistent formulas of the form ϕa0 ∧ ψa0 ∧ ¬ϕaj
or ϕa0 ∧ ψa0 ∧ ¬ψaj (they are of maximal b-depth k). Let
γ be independent of all formulas in A. Let Sa be the set
of all (AXtn-) maximally consistent sets of formulas, con-
structed from formulas of maximal b-depth k, and contain-
ing ϕa0 ∧ (¬ψa0 ∨ (ψa0 ∧ γ)), and hence by induction hy-
pothesis they are satisfiable in some model. Note that all for-
mulas in Sa are inONLtn. The b-depth is maximally 2k+2.
Letting k′′ = 2k + 2, we have that for all S′ ∈ Sa, there is
a 〈w, ek′′b 〉 such that {}, ek
′′
b , w |= S′. Let k′ = k′′ + 1. Let-
ting ek
′
a be all such k
′-structures 〈w, ek′′b 〉 for each S′ ∈ Sa
makes Obj+a (e
k′
a ) = Sa (in contrast, for Thereom 23 we
dealt with Obja). We claim that this k
′-structure for Al-
ice, a j′-structure for Bob constructed similarly, and a world
where σ holds (there is such a world since σ is propositional
and consistent) is a model where α is satisfied. The proof
proceeds as in Theorem 23. We show the case of ¬Laϕaj .
SinceLaϕa0∧¬Laϕaj is consistent wrt.AXt+1n , it must
be that ϕa0 ∧¬ϕaj is consistent wrt. AXt+1n . Further, since
ϕa0, ϕaj ∈ ONLtn, they must consistent be wrt. AXtn (for
if not, they cannot by definition be consistent wrt. AXt+1n ).
This means that eitherϕa0∧¬ϕaj∧ψa0 orϕa0∧¬ϕaj∧¬ψa0
is consistent. If the former is, then so is ϕa0∧¬ϕaj∧ψa0∧γ.
Since Sa consist of all AXtn-consistent formulas containing
ϕa0∧(¬ψa0∧(ψa0∧γ)), there is clearly a S′ ∈ Sa such that
¬ϕaj ∈ S′. Consequently, it can not be that ek′a , {}, w′ |=
Laϕaj . Thus, ek
′
a , {}, w′ |= ¬Laϕaj . 
Thus, we have a sound and complete axiomatization for the
propositional fragment of ONLn. In comparison to Lake-
meyer (1993), the axiomatization goes beyond a language
that restricts the nesting of Ni. In contrast to Halpern and
Lakemeyer (2001), the axiomatization does not necessitate
the use of semantic notions in the proof theory. A third ax-
iomatization by (Waaler 2004; Waaler and Solhaug 2005)
proposes an interesting alternative to deal with the circular-
ity in a generalized A5. The idea is to first define consis-
tency by formulating a fragment of the axiom system in the
sequent calculus. Quite analogous to having t-axioms, they
allow us to apply A5n on i-objective formulas of a lower
depth, thus avoiding circularity without the need to appeal
to satisfiability as in (Halpern and Lakemeyer 2001). Waaler
and Solhaug (2005) also define a semantics for multi-agent
only-knowing which does not appeal to canonical mod-
els. Instead, they define a class of Kripke structures which
need to satisfy certain constraints. Unfortunately, these con-
straints are quite involved and, as the authors admit, the na-
ture of these models “is complex and hard to penetrate.”
To get a feel of the axiomatization, let us consider a well
studied example from (Halpern and Lakemeyer 2001) to
see where we differ. Suppose Alice assumes the following
default: unless I know that Bob knows my secret then he
does not know it. If the default is all that she knows, then
she nonmonotonically comes to believe that Bob does not
know her secret. Let γ be a proposition that denotes Al-
ice’s secret, and we want to show that ` Oa(δ) ⊃ La¬Lbγ,
where δ = ¬LaLbγ ⊃ ¬Lbγ. We write (Def.) to mean
Oaα ≡ Laα ∧Na¬α, and we freely reason with proposi-
tional logic (PL) or K45n.
1. Oa(δ) ⊃ La¬LaLbγ ⊃ La¬Lbγ Def.,PL,A2n
2. Oa(δ) ⊃Na¬LaLbγ ∧NaLbγ Def.,PL,K45n
3. NaLbγ ⊃ ¬LaLbγ A51n
4. ¬LaLbγ ⊃ La¬LaLbγ A4n
5. Oa(δ) ⊃ La¬LaLbγ 2,3,4,PL
6. Oa(δ) ⊃ La¬Lbγ 1,5,PL
We use A51n, and it is applicable because ¬Lbγ is a-
objective and K45n-consistent. Now, suppose Alice is cau-
tious. She changes her default to assume that if she does not
believe Bob to only-know some set of facts θ ∈ Φ, then θ is
not all that he knows. We would like to show
` Oa(¬LaObθ ⊃ ¬Obθ) ⊃ La¬Obθ
Of course, this default is different from δ in containing Obθ
rather than Lbγ. The proof is identical, except that we
use A52n, since ¬Obθ ∈ ONL1n is a-objective and AX1n-
consistent. The latter proof requires reasoning with the sat-
isfiability modal operator in Halpern and Lakemeyer (2001),
and is not provable with the axioms of Lakemeyer (1993).
Autoepistemic Logic
Having examined the properties of multi-agent only-
knowing, in terms of a semantics for both the first-order and
propositional case, and an axiomatization for the proposi-
tional case, in the current section we discuss how the seman-
tics also captures autoepistemic logic (AEL). AEL, as orig-
inally developed by Moore (1985), intends to allow agents
to draw conclusions, by making observations of their own
epistemic states. For instance, Alice concludes that she has
no brother because if she did have one then she would have
known about it, and she does not know about it (Moore
1985). The characterization of such beliefs are defined us-
ing fixpoints called stable expansions. In the single agent
case, Levesque (1990) showed that the beliefs of an agent
who only-knows α is precisely the stable expansion of α.
Of course, the leverage with the former is that it is speci-
fied using regular entailments. In Lakemeyer (1993), and
Halpern and Lakemeyer (2001), a many agent generaliza-
tion of AEL is considered in the sense of a stable expansion
for every agent, and relating this to what the agent only-
knows. But their generalizations are only for the proposi-
tional fragment, while Levesque’s definitions involved first-
order entailments. In contrast, we obtain the correspond-
ing quantificational multi-agent generalization of AEL. We
state the main theorems below. The proofs are omitted since
they follow very closely from the ideas for the single agent
case (Levesque and Lakemeyer 2001).
Definition 29. Let A be a set of formulas, and Γ is the i-
stable expansion of A iff it the set of first-order implications
of A ∪ {Liβ | β ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬Liβ | β 6∈ Γ}.
Definition 30 (Maximal structure). If eka is a k-structure, let
e+a be a k-structure with the addition of all 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 6∈ eka
such that for every α ∈ ONL−n of maximal a, b-depth k, k−
1, if eka, {}, w |= Laα for any world w then eka, ek−1b , w′ |=
α. Define Γ = {β | β is basic and e+a , {}, w |= Laβ} as
the belief set of e+a .
Theorem 31. Let M = 〈e+a , ejb, w〉 be a model, where e+a
is a maximal structure for a. Let Γ be the belief set of e+a ,
and suppose α ∈ ONL−n is of maximal a, b-depth k, k − 1.
Then, M |= Oaα iff Γ is the a-stable expansion of α.
Theorem 31 essentially says that the complete set of basic
beliefs at a maximal epistemic state where α is all that i
knows, precisely coincides with the i-stable expansion of α.
Axiomatizing Validity
Extending the work in (Lakemeyer 1993) and (Halpern
1993), which was only restricted to formulas in ONL−n ,
Halpern and Lakemeyer (2001) proposed a multi-agent
only-knowing logic that handles the nesting of Ni opera-
tors. But as discussed, there are two undesirable features.
The first is a semantics based on canonical models, and the
second is a proof theory that axiomatizes validity. Although
such a construction is far from natural, we show in this sec-
tion that they do indeed capture the desired properties of
only-knowing. This also instructs us that our axiomatization
avoids such problems in a reasonable manner.
Recall that the language of (Halpern and Lakemeyer
2001) is ONL+n , which is ONLn and a modal operator
for validity, Val. A modal operator Sat, for satisfiability, is
used freely such that Val(α) is syntactically equivalent to
¬Sat(¬α). To enable comparisons, we present a variant of
our logic, that has all its main features, but has additional
notions to handle the extended language. We then show that
this logic and (Halpern and Lakemeyer 2001) agree on the
set of valid sentences from ONL+n (and also ONLn).
The main feature of (Halpern and Lakemeyer 2001) is the
proof theory AX ′n, and a semantics that is sound and com-
plete forAX ′n via the extended canonical model. AX
′
n con-
sists of A1n −A4n, MP, NEC and the following:
A5′n. Sat(¬α) ⊃ (Niα ⊃ ¬Laα), if α is i-objective.
V1. Val(α) ∧ Val(α ⊃ β) ⊃ Val(β).
V2. Sat(p1 ∧ . . . pn), if pi’s are literals and p1 ∧ . . . pn is
propositionally consistent.
V3. Sat(α ∧ β1) ∧ . . . Sat(α ∧ βk) ∧ Sat(γ ∧ δ1) . . . ∧
Sat(γ∧δm)∧Val(α∨γ) ⊃ Sat(Liα∧¬Li¬β1 . . .∧
Niγ ∧ ¬Ni¬δ1 . . .), if α, βi, γ, δi are i-objective.
V4. Sat(α) ∧ Sat(β) ⊃ Sat(α ∧ β), if α is i-objective
and β is i-subjective.
NECVal. From α infer Val(α).
The essence of our new logic, in terms of a notion of depth
(with |Val(α)|i = |α|i) and a semantical account over pos-
sible worlds, is as before. The complete semantic definition
for formulas in ONL+n of maximal a, b-depth of k, j is:
1. -8. as before,
9. eka, e
j
b, w |= Val(α) if eka, ejb, w |= α for all eka, ejb, w.
Satisfiability and validity (|=) are understood analogously.15
LetONL+n
1
, . . .ONL+n
t
be also defined analogously. Fur-
ther, let axiomsA1n−A5tn be defined forONL+n
t
. For in-
stance,A5tn is defined for any i-objective ¬α ∈ ONL+n
t−1
that is consistent with A1n −A5t−1n . Then, the semantics
above is characterized by the proof theory AX+n
t
defined
(inductively) forONL+n
t
, consisting ofAXtn (A1n−A5tn,
MP, NEC) with NECVal as an additional inference rule.
Lemma 32. For all α ∈ ONL+n
t
, AX+n
t ` α iff |= α.
The proof of this lemma, and those of the following theo-
rems are given in the appendix. We proceed to show that
Sat(α) is provable from AX ′n iff α is AX
+
n
t
-consistent.
Theorem 33. For all α ∈ ONL+n
t
, AX ′n ` Sat(α) iff α is
AX+n
t
-consistent.
This allows us to show that AX ′n and AX
+
n
t
agree on prov-
able sentences.
15Note that Val corresponds precisely to how validity is defined.
Theorem 34. For all α ∈ ONL+n
t
, AX ′n ` α iff AX+n
t `
α.
Lemma 35. For all α ∈ ONL+n
t
, |= α iff α is valid in
(Halpern and Lakemeyer 2001).
Proof. AX ′n is sound and complete for (Halpern and Lake-
meyer 2001), and AX+n
t
is sound and complete for |=. 
Since it can be shown that every α ∈ ONL+n is provably
equivalent to some α′ ∈ ONLn (Halpern and Lakemeyer
2001), we also obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 36. For all α ∈ ONLtn, |= α iff α is valid in
(Halpern and Lakemeyer 2001).
Conclusions
This paper has the following new results. We have a first-
order modal logic for multi-agent only-knowing that we
show, for the first time, generalizes Levesque’s semantics.
Unlike all attempts so far, we neither make use of proof-
theoretic notions of maximal consistency nor Kripke struc-
tures (Waaler and Solhaug 2005). The benefit is that the
semantic proofs are straightforward, and we understand pos-
sible worlds precisely as Levesque meant. We then analyzed
a propositional subset, and showed first that the axiom sys-
tem from Lakemeyer (1993) is sound and complete for a re-
stricted language. We used this result to devise a new proof
theory that does not require us axiomatize any semantic no-
tions (Halpern and Lakemeyer 2001). Our axiomatization
was shown to be sound and complete for the semantics, and
its use is straightforward on formulas involving the nesting
of at most operators. In the process, we revisited the fea-
tures of only-knowing and compared the semantical frame-
work to other approaches. Its behavior seems to coincide
with our intuitions, and it also captures a multi-agent gen-
eralization of Moore’s AEL. Finally, although the axiomati-
zation of Halpern and Lakemeyer (2001) is not natural, we
showed that they essentially capture the desired properties
of multi-agent only-knowing, but at much expense.
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Appendix
Lemma 32. For all α ∈ ONL+n
t
, AX+n
t ` α iff |= α.
Proof. The proof is via induction. Using Theorems 25 and
28 as the base cases in the induction, there is one additional
step on the structure of formulas.
Soundness: The base case holds for formulas α ∈ ONLtn
for AXtn. Suppose now if AX
t
n ` α, then AX+n
t ` Val(α).
But if AXtn ` α then (by induction hypothesis) at all mod-
els eka, e
j
b, w |= α, and so by the definition at all models
eka, e
j
b, w |= Val(α) or |= Val(α).
Completeness. For the base case, we know that if for all
models eka, e
j
b, w |= α then AXtn ` α. Suppose |= Val(α),
then by definition, for all models eka, e
j
b, w |= α iff (by hy-
pothesis) AXtn ` α. So, AX+n
t ` Val(α). 
Theorem 33. For all α ∈ ONL+n
t
, AX ′n ` Sat(α) iff α is
AX+n
t
-consistent.
Proof. It is helpful to have the following variant of Lemma
27 at hand, and a corollary thereof.
Lemma 37. Suppose φ, ψ ∈ ONL+n
t−1
are i-objective
AX+n
t
-consistent formulas, and |= φ∨ψ. Then Liφ∧Niψ
is AX+n
t
-consistent.
Proof. Suppose not. Then AX+n
t ` ¬(Laφ∧Naψ), that is
AX+n
t ` ¬Laφ ∨ ¬Naψ. Then, by Lemma 32, |= ¬Laφ ∨
¬Naψ. Let Wφ = {w | w |= φ}. Let eka = Wφ × Ek−1
be a ek for Alice. Then clearly, eka, {}, w 6|= ¬Laφ. It
must be then that eka, {}, w |= ¬Naψ. Then there is some
〈w′, ek−1b 〉 6∈ eka such that eka, ek−1b , w′ |= ¬ψ. And clearly,
for all 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 6∈ eka, eka, ek−1b , w′ |= ¬φ (by construc-
tion). It follows that there is a 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 6∈ eka where eka,
ek−1b , w
′ |= ¬(φ∨ψ), contradicting the validity of φ∨ψ. 
Corollary 38. Suppose α, β1, . . . βk, γ, δ1, . . . δm ∈
ONL+n
t−1
, are i-objective AX+n
t
-consistent formulas, and
|= α ∨ γ. Then Liα ∧ ¬Li¬β1 . . . ∧ ¬Li¬βk ∧ Niγ ∧
¬Niδ1 . . . ∧ ¬Ni¬δm is AX+n
t
-consistent.
Returning to Theorem 33: Proof on the length of the deriva-
tive, using induction on t. Let α be a consistent propo-
sitional formula. Then, by V2, AX ′n ` Sat(α). Since
it is a consistent propositional formula, it is also AX+n
t
-
consistent. Assume theorem holds for α ∈ ONL+n
t−1
.
Suppose we have Sat(α∧βk), Sat(γ ∧ δm),¬Sat(¬(α∨ γ))
∈ ONL+n
t−1
then by V3, AX ′n ` Sat(Liα ∧ ¬Li¬βk ∧
Niγ∧¬Ni¬δm). By hypothesis α∧βk, γ∧δm are AX+n
t
-
consistent. And ¬(α ∨ γ) is not AX+n
t
-consistent, and so
AX+n
t ` α ∨ γ. By Lemma 32, |= α ∨ γ. Clearly, by
Corollary 38, Liα ∧ ¬Li¬βk ∧Niγ ∧ ¬Ni¬δm is AX+n
t
-
consistent. Finally, suppose that you have Sat(α) for some
i-objective α and Sat(β) for some i-subjective β, then by
V4, AX ′n ` Sat(α ∧ β). By induction hypothesis, α and
β are AX+n
t
-consistent. By Lemma 32, α is satisfiable and
β is satisfiable, and so is α ∧ β. By Lemma 32, α ∧ β is
AX+n
t
-consistent. The other direction is symmetric. 
Theorem 34. AX ′n ` α iff AX+n
t ` α, for α ∈ ONL+n
t
.
Proof. Since axioms A1n − A4n, MP, NEC, NECVal
are common to both, their use is not discussed. To show
that AX ′n ` α ⇒ AX+n
t ` α, suppose you had Sat(¬α)
for some i-objective α ∈ ONL+n
t−1
then using A5′n, one
could show that Niα ⊃ ¬Liα. From Theorem 33, we
also know ¬α is AX+n
t−1
-consistent. Then, we can show
Niα ⊃ ¬Liα as well using A5tn. V2,V3,V4 follow
immediately from Theorem 33. Assuming now that the
proof holds for base cases, using V1, if AX ′n ` Val(α)
and AX ′n ` Val(α ⊃ β) then AX ′n ` Val(β). Now,
by induction hypothesis, AX+n
t ` Val(α) iff by Lemma
32 |= Val(α), and so |= α. Similarly, |= α ⊃ β, and
thus, |= β and |= Val(β) by the semantics. By Lemma 32,
AX+n
t ` Val(β).
To show that AX+n
t ` α ⇒ AX ′n ` α, suppose ¬α ∈
ONL+n
t−1
is i-objective and AXt−1n -consistent, then one
can proveNiα ⊃ ¬Liα. Now, ¬α is also AX+n
t
-consistent
and by Theorem 33, AX ′n ` Sat(¬α). Then we can prove
Niα ⊃ ¬Liα, as desired. 
